Sustainability in the Manufacturing of Electronic Devices on a Global Scale Essay Example for Free

Sustainability in the Manufacturing of Electronic Devices on a Global Scale Essay Nowadays a world without electronic devices is unthinkable. We use them in every part in our daily routine. Electronic device helps us to wake up in the morning, brush our teeth, make our coffee and even read the newspaper. Each of us uses these devices, but no one thinks about their production or disposal after. Such thoughtlessness provides a general problem in our society. Electronic devices have a shorter product life cycle than in the past. Their numbers increased rapidly worldwide. But what happens with them when we throw them away? All too often our disused electronical equipment go to the global landfills where toxins pollute the environment and valuable commodities such as gold, silver or indium are buried unused. The consequences for humans and nature are devastating. In order to gain benefits form the e-Waste, it can be recycled. However, this leads us to another problem. Some industrialized countries, including the U. S. , Europe and Australia, export their electronic waste preferably in emerging and developing countries. It is estimated that 50 to 80 % of the electronic waste is exported form developed countries. There substances are removed from the electronic waste with simplest means (fire, hammer, acid bath, etc. ). This is a heavy strain on people and the environment. Already children are exposed to toxic substances. Diseases are often the result. On the other side the waste forms the livelihood for many people. For example in Ghana, 41 tons of electronic waste going to be handled. For thousands of people in the poorest countries in the world, this is the only way to earn a little money. Often it is the only was not to enter into prostitution or drug dealing for many people. The reasons for the high volume of e-Waste are varied. Neither often there are no replacement parts for defective equipment, so they cannot be repaired. Or in many cases it is cheaper to by a new device, than to repair an old one. Devices also often aged premature. This is provided by the manufacturer and should also lead to higher consumption. It is hard to find a mobile phone that does more than three years without problems. Another thing is that the design, functionality and trends are changing very fast. We want to have always the newest mobile Phone, Computer and Tablet. With an outdated device you will often be ridiculed. One way to solve the e-Waste Problem would be to make it attractive or possible to consumers to let old device repair. Produces should ensure that their products work a long time. That could lead to a reduction of electronic Waste. But it would also help to change our buying behaviour. Is it really necessary to have the newest mobile Phone, computer or tablet? However, e-Waste is not completely avoidable. So it is also important to find strategies for the recycling of e-Waste. The parts that can be reused should be extracted from the e-Waste. It must give strict guidelines to protect workers from toxic substances. In my opinion it is up to us to solve this problem. We are responsible for the e-Waste and we should also take care of it. First, it is important to make the issue known globally. Many people are not aware of the problem. It should already be taken care on sustainable manufacturing when buying products. But most of all new devices should not be bought as long as the old ones can still be repaired. And the newest iPhone is not the most important thing in the world.

Julius Caesar - Mark Antony :: essays research papers

Mark Antony The character of Mark Antony from Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar may be viewed as simply the confident and devoted supporter of Julius Caesar. On the contrary, Antony presents the qualities of a shrewd flatterer, a ruthless tyrant, as well as a loyal follower. Antony’s characteristics will change as the play progresses. He will begin using flattery to get what he wants, but he will eventually depend on his powerful relentlessness. Furthermore, Antony uses these various attributes to make him successful. Throughout the play, Antony uses flattering to achieve his goals. Following the assassination of Caesar, Antony quickly grasps that he must deal with Brutus, and he has the shrewdness to take advantage of Brutus’s gullibility. Antony has his servant say, "Brutus is noble, wise, valiant, and honest" (III i 126). From this point, it is clear that Antony intends to flatter Brutus and to work upon those personal qualities of Brutus which represent his fundamental weaknesses. Antony then comes to the Capitol where he further flatters the conspirators by shaking their hands and saying, "Friends am I with you all, and love you all..." (III i 220). This act symbolizes that Antony has made a new friendship with the conspirators, but in reality, he is plotting to seek revenge so he can take over Rome. Antony is also able to flatter the vast angry crowd in order to get his way. He is first able to get the crowd to feel sorry for him. This feeling is evident when the second plebeian says, "Poor soul, his eyes are red as fire with weeping" (III ii 116). Antony is then able to turn the people in the crowd against Brutus by teasing them with Caesar’s will. Antony says, "And being men, hearing the will of Caesar, it will inflame you, it will make you mad" (III ii 144-145). This blandishment provokes an immediate response of the crowd demanding that Antony read Caesar’s will. Although Antony uses flattery to get what he wants, he will also show respect for others with his devotion and loyalty. One of the most significant characteristics of Mark Antony is his strong, affectionate loyalty to Julius Caesar. Antony’s devotion to Caesar extends beyond a simple friendship, but politically as well. This fact is best recognized when he offers Caesar the crown of Rome three times in the beginning of the play. This act shows that Antony is dedicated to Caesar because he is quite willing to serve under the rule of an ambitious tyrant. Immediately following the assassination of Caesar, Antony acts as though he Julius Caesar - Mark Antony :: essays research papers Mark Antony The character of Mark Antony from Shakespeare’s play Julius Caesar may be viewed as simply the confident and devoted supporter of Julius Caesar. On the contrary, Antony presents the qualities of a shrewd flatterer, a ruthless tyrant, as well as a loyal follower. Antony’s characteristics will change as the play progresses. He will begin using flattery to get what he wants, but he will eventually depend on his powerful relentlessness. Furthermore, Antony uses these various attributes to make him successful. Throughout the play, Antony uses flattering to achieve his goals. Following the assassination of Caesar, Antony quickly grasps that he must deal with Brutus, and he has the shrewdness to take advantage of Brutus’s gullibility. Antony has his servant say, "Brutus is noble, wise, valiant, and honest" (III i 126). From this point, it is clear that Antony intends to flatter Brutus and to work upon those personal qualities of Brutus which represent his fundamental weaknesses. Antony then comes to the Capitol where he further flatters the conspirators by shaking their hands and saying, "Friends am I with you all, and love you all..." (III i 220). This act symbolizes that Antony has made a new friendship with the conspirators, but in reality, he is plotting to seek revenge so he can take over Rome. Antony is also able to flatter the vast angry crowd in order to get his way. He is first able to get the crowd to feel sorry for him. This feeling is evident when the second plebeian says, "Poor soul, his eyes are red as fire with weeping" (III ii 116). Antony is then able to turn the people in the crowd against Brutus by teasing them with Caesar’s will. Antony says, "And being men, hearing the will of Caesar, it will inflame you, it will make you mad" (III ii 144-145). This blandishment provokes an immediate response of the crowd demanding that Antony read Caesar’s will. Although Antony uses flattery to get what he wants, he will also show respect for others with his devotion and loyalty. One of the most significant characteristics of Mark Antony is his strong, affectionate loyalty to Julius Caesar. Antony’s devotion to Caesar extends beyond a simple friendship, but politically as well. This fact is best recognized when he offers Caesar the crown of Rome three times in the beginning of the play. This act shows that Antony is dedicated to Caesar because he is quite willing to serve under the rule of an ambitious tyrant. Immediately following the assassination of Caesar, Antony acts as though he

Philosophy the Meaning of Life Essay

There are many different views as to what makes life meaningful. Philosopher, Thomas Nagel, presents a good argument as to why a â€Å"Sisyphisian† existence is meaningless. This does not necessarily mean that all lives are meaningless, because Richard Taylor and Raymond Martin provide strong evidence that prove otherwise. According to Greek mythology, â€Å"The Myth of Sisyphus†, by Albert Camus, condemns Sisyphus to forever roll the same rock up a hill; only to see it roll back down once he reached the top. Sisyphus’ â€Å"scorn of the gods, his hatred of death, and his passion for life† was the reason for his punishment and endless turmoil in accomplishing nothing (Camus 775). In Nagel’s essay â€Å"The Absurd†, his views on the meaninglessness of life and the absurdity of it, provide evidence that Sisyphus leads a meaningless life and how all people are condemned to lead this life. He points out that the absurd comes about by â€Å"the collision between the seriousness with which we take our lives and the perpetual possibility of regarding everything about which we are serious as arbitrary, or open to doubt†(Nagel 769). In other words, the things people take seriously in their lives are always open to doubt. Nagel believes that human life becomes absurd when the realization of living an unreasonable life becomes known. â€Å"Once the fundamental doubt has begun, it cannot be laid to rest†(771). When people begin to doubt their existence, they search for answers that cannot be justified. Humans are capable of being self-conscious and self-inspiring which gives them the ability to step back and observe themselves from an outside point of view. This allows them to see the reality and pointlessness of their goals. Some people try to escape the absurd and try to add meaning to their lives by giving themselves a role in something bigger. When Nagel says, â€Å"a role in some larger enterprise cannot confer significance unless that enterprise is itself significant†, he means that the larger enterprise cannot have meaning, unless the enterprise as a whole has meaning (770). According to Nagel, for something to be meaningful it must be objectively meaningful. For example, Sisyphus leads an objectively meaningless life because he is condemned to roll the stone up the hill forever and achieving nothing. Nagel says that the life of a mouse is not absurd because the mouse is not aware that it is only a mouse; it does not have the ability to perceive its life like humans can. â€Å"Absurdity is one of the most human things about us: a manifestation of our most advanced and interesting characteristics†(774). The absurdity shows people that their lives are meaningless; and when this is recognized, the logical conclusion is suicide. This solution to absurdity is not accepted; instead it is suggested to keep on living in spite of the absurdity of life. â€Å"If we relied hard on reason our life would have collapsed† because relying only on reason would leave people with many philosophical questions, leaving them to dwell on the doubts of life (773). One way to achieve some concept of the meaning of life is to consider the meaninglessness of it as Richard Taylor has done. Like Nagel, Taylor views the endless cycle of Sisyphus pushing the stone up the hill over and over again as a perfect example of a meaningless existence. Taylor proves that a life is meaningless if it is spent in pointless and repetitive toil. Sisyphus’s repetitive act of rolling a stone up a hill never gets him anywhere nor does anything come from it, and therefore his life is meaningless. However, Taylor came up with concepts that could provide some meaning and hope to Sisyphus’s life. First, if Sisyphus were still condemned to endlessly rolling stones up a hill, but instead of the stones rolling back down, they would â€Å"become the foundation for a vast and beautiful indestructible temple†¦with this construction going on and on, endlessly, and the temple gradually becoming ever more beautiful and inspiring and capable of enduring to the end of time† (Taylor 788). With these conditions, Sisyphus’s actions now have a purpose because something results from his efforts and creates lasting significance; but his efforts are still endless and therefore still have no meaning. He is still doing the same repetitive routine, and if the temple were to be finished, what then? Taylor believes that â€Å"the greatest evil that can be inflicted upon anyone is unrelieved boredom†, which means that if Sisyphus were to ever complete his task he would become engulfed in boredom until he finds another task. Mankind continues the daily routine to escape this evil; without projects and activities man would be bored. Taylor concludes that human life from an objective viewpoint is â€Å"described as a clockworklike thing, without purpose or meaning† because it will always consist of a routine that will never end (790). Another case in which Sisyphus’ life can become meaningful is if his strongest desire was to push stones up a hill, for this is what makes him happiest. This makes his life subjectively meaningful; it is meaningful to him because it is fulfilling his desire. Taylor states â€Å"Sisyphus, will view his life, not as one of hard labor, certainly not one of meaninglessness, buts as good† because he is sentenced to forever doing something that he enjoys (791). This case still does not show a completely meaningful life because it is not whether he enjoys his existence; it is if his existence has meaning, which is still spent in routine. Taylor concludes, â€Å"the only genuinely meaningful existence is one that is creative†(792). For instance, if Sisyphus was willing to roll the stones up the mountain to build an everlasting temple that is not only â€Å"beautiful to his eyes, but truly beautiful, in the eyes of every future generation†¦we have, finally, the perfect image of meaningfulness†(792). Taylor says that one can make anything meaningful by making it creative; not only in the sense of creating physical objects, but also that creativity is a state of mind. â€Å"Some can – live meaningfully, by creating our own meanings, whether great or small, and then literally glorying in them, caring not in the least what we â€Å"get† from it all†(793). Having this creative sense leaves people able to find meaning everywhere. Finding out the meaninglessness of life helped Taylor find concepts that could make life meaningful. Martin’s essay, â€Å"A Fast Car and a Good Woman†, addresses the problems of both Nagel and Taylor by depicting his own meaning of life. He describes the difference between the problems of the meaning of life and the problems of life itself. Martin says that the problem of the meaning of life is the philosophical question of whether or not life can be worth living. Instead of focusing on this subject, Martin discuses how the problem of life, â€Å"is a practical question of how to live our lives so that they are as worth living as they can be†(Martin 1). Since there is no objective meaning in life as Nagel says, Martin does not try and find it, but tries to see what would make life meaningful in the psychological sense. Martin believes in practical wisdom, â€Å"if we take proper care of our lives, questions of meaning will take care of themselves†, that way people are not worried about the meaning of life. If someone worries about the meaning of life, like Nagel said, and tries to give it reason, it will result in madness. There are those people who cannot set questions of meaning aside; Leo Tolstoy is a prime example of this kind of person. When Tolstoy says, â€Å"†¦And I was absolutely unable to make any reply. The questions were not waiting and I had to answer them at once: if I did not answer them, I could not live†, he means that he needs to be able to understand the questions of meaning before he can move on with his life (1). Martin says that philosophical questions bring about existent anguish, for instance, when one’s sense of security is lost because it was built on a foundation of unquestioned beliefs. For example, a person whose sense of security that rests on religious beliefs suddenly become subject to doubt, results in such suffering that calls into question the meaning of life. Philosophical questions normally only challenge the beliefs we depend on for security and not necessarily the meaning of life. Martin says that the suffering is not because of the philosophical problem of the meaning of life, but the sudden realization that our personal beliefs rest on uncertain assumptions. Nagel and Tolstoy both believe that â€Å"philosophical challenges to the meaning of life are an important source of psychological problems†(3). With this belief, Martin’s view of practical meaning is wrong. Not being able to overlook the philosophical questions of meaning will ultimately bring you down because of the realizations it brings. Nagel claims that there is not solution to this, because the absurd cannot be avoided. Martin believes that when life is at its subjective best, that questions of the meaning of life do not arise. At this moment one has temporarily solved the problem of life because the thought of meaning did not arise. This statement makes practical wisdom valid because, â€Å"when we are happy, questions about the meaning of our lives rarely ever become problems†(3). To become happy one must take chances, and if one goes down the wrong path to happiness, it could lead to philosophical problems about the meaning of life. Taylor, like Nagel, uses philosophical questions differ between objective meaninglessness and subjective meaning. He views that life is objectively meaningless, but not completely meaningless. According to Martin, Taylor finds meaning everywhere and Nagel finds is nowhere. However, neither one is psychologically valid because they both rely on philosophical questions for their meaning. Martin says that Taylor’s view is too romantic and makes meaning too easy and Nagel is the opposite with an intellectual view, which makes meaning too hard. Martin agrees with a view suggested by Taylor’s discussion, â€Å"that people have meaningful lives not when they are doing what they will to do but when they are doing what they love to do†(4). Martin believes that life is not essentially meaningful but that it can become meaningful if one does something they love to do. When at one’s subjective best, when not disturbed by questions about the meaning of life, are you also completely satisfied at this moment? According to Martin, it is close enough to being completely satisfied, but it does not last long. â€Å"Since satisfaction doesn’t last, then either we have to continually resatisfy ourselves or successfully and pleasantly distract ourselves from the fact that we haven’t†(5). This is our fate, but it does not completely provide a solution to the problem of life. Therefore, Martin suggests that everyone is chronically unsatisfied. This repetitiveness is one of Taylor’s reasoning’s to the meaninglessness of life, which is reason to why life is not essentially meaningful. To solve the problems of life one does what makes them happy, for Martin this consists of a fast car and a good woman. Happiness is different for everyone. Martin’s view on life seems to be the most reasonable and ultimately provides happiness for people. He avoids suffering by completely ignoring the philosophical question of the meaning of life. Nagel and Taylor both concentrate on this meaning of life, which lead to no happy results. At least Martin lives a subjectively happy life by not being troubled by the meanings of it. However, Nagel’s argument completely rejects Martin’s because according to Nagel, the absurd cannot be ignored once it is recognized. Martin clearly recognizes but puts it aside to make him believe that there is meaning. If someone lives a life believing that it is meaningless, then what is the point of living? For the reason of trying to perceive any sort of meaning for human life is so that humans do not always live in doubt. Overall, life objectively has no meaning but that does not leave human existence in utter turmoil. The evidence that Taylor provides, gives us a sense of how there is hope for a meaning in life. Eventually concluding that life would need to be given meaning, purpose, variety, and the sense of creativity to become meaningful, â€Å"the only meaningful existence is a creative existence†(Taylor 792). This is the only meaning for the philosophical meaning of life. Taking Martin’s view, and putting aside philosophical meaning and taking the psychological meaning, gives humans a positive outlook on life by letting subjective happiness be the basis to the solution to the problem of life. All views of life are all based on the struggle to overcome doubt, so ultimately â€Å"the itch of desire returns†¦until death ends the struggle – perhaps forever†(Martin 6).

The Horizontal Effect of Human Rights in the UK - Free Essay Example

Sample details Pages: 11 Words: 3201 Downloads: 4 Date added: 2017/06/26 Category Law Essay Tags: Human Rights Essay Did you like this example? Application of the à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"Horizontal Effectà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ of Human Rights Law in the UK à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã…“The horizontal effect of the application of human rights law in the UK has important implications for the law of tort in relation to protection of privacy for private citizens. However the law is being applied in a piecemeal fashionà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‚  Critically discuss. Introduction: Human rights protect an individual from unwarranted interference by the state, seeking to establish a just social and legal order to enable a person to live a full and productive life, free from fear, tyranny and discrimination and under the rule of law. Don’t waste time! Our writers will create an original "The Horizontal Effect of Human Rights in the UK" essay for you Create order UKà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) and its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Strasbourg court) leading to the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) to give domestic effect to the Convention rights have had far reaching effects on judicial philosophy, approach and jurisprudence of English courts. This is not to say that common law was oblivious to human rights concerns. In Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle[1] Lord Bingham remarked that it would be surprising if conduct which violated a fundamental right or freedom of the individual did not find a reflection in a body of law ordinarily as sensitive to human needs as the common law but conceded that common law had evolved in a direction indicated by the Convention in areas in which the two overlapped. Given that human rights provisions are aimed at the excesses of the State, this essay discusses the impact of human rights law inter se d isputes between two private individuals, particularly in relation to the protection of privacy, which ordinarily falls under the domain of torts at common law. As such, the essay examines the incremental expansion of human rights provisions into the area of private and privacy law and whether or not the application of this new jurisprudence has been consistent over the years. Vertical and Horizontal Effect: The HRA is intended to have a vertical effect, i.e., it is applicable to laws and acts of state authorities affecting the lives of common citizens. Thus, s 3 requires that every primary and secondary legislation whenever enacted must be interpreted à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"in a way which is compatible with the Convention rightsà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ failing which a competent court can declare it to be incompatible with Convention rights under s 4 prompting a competent Minister to move a Parliamentary amendment under s 10. S 6 prohibits a public authority from acting in a way which is inc ompatible with a Convention right failing which a à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"victimà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ can move the court under section 7(1)(b) and seek compensation/damages under s 8(1) of the Act. Accordingly, Wright states that it seems clear that the scheme of the Act precludes direct horizontal effect in terms of basing a private action purely on a Convention right as the differentiation that the Act makes between public authorities which are subject to the Act and other bodies/persons would then be otiose.[2] However, the justification for a à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"horizontal effectà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢, at least what is termed as à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"indirect horizontal effectà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ is often argued to be through s 6(3) of the Act which proscribes public authorities from acting in a manner which is incompatible with Convention right and includes a court or tribunal. Thus, the argument of academics is that courts are obliged to recognise and give effect to Convention rights even while adjudica ting private disputes.[3] Some basis for this position, particularly with regard to tort cases can also be found in the statements of high constitutional authorities. The Lord Chancellor while rejecting an amendment moved by the Chairman of the Press Complaints Commission to remove courts from the definition of public authority stated that while the courts could not play a legislative role and grant new remedies for infringement of Convention rights unless allowed by common law, they did have a duty to act compatibly with the Convention even in cases involving individuals, thereby affording them an opportunity to develop the common law by relying on existing domestic principles in the realm of trespass, nuisance, copyright, confidence, etc. to develop a common law right to privacy.[4] That the courts do not have the authority to carve out new areas of tortious liability and causes of action has been reiterated in the landmark case of Campbell v MGN as well.[5] At one extreme are the proponents of à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"direct horizontal effectà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ of the Act who assert that the HRA is directly applicable to private disputes and the courts are obliged to take into account this legal position. The most ardent supporter in this regard has been the late academic and Queenà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s Counsel, Sir William Wade.[6] Murray Hunt is also a supporter of this position, writing in 1998 that pre-enactment documents (White Paper, Parliamentary debates, etc.) and Convention jurisprudence all à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"point irresistiblyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ to the fact that the Convention is horizontally applicable when the Act comes into force but will not give rise to an independent cause of action for breach of Convention rights and that over time, nobody will be without a remedy in domestic law for breach of their Convention rights.[7] Another argument in support of this notion is that the terminology of à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"horizontalityà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ is itself misleadin g as it presumes that the HRA regulates the relationship between the citizens and the state as asserted by Sedley LJ. However, the true objective of the Act is to charge the state with a positive duty to protect human rights violations by abuse of power, whether by public or private entities.[8] Courts, however, have been less than certain on the horizontal effect or application of the Act or Convention rights on inter se disputes and judicial opinion in this regard shows a chequered history. Thus, in Gregory v Portsmouth City Council[9] decided just before the HRA came into force, the House of Lords did not take into account Convention rights or European jurisprudence while disposing of a case in which the issue was whether the tort of malicious prosecution extended to malicious domestic disciplinary proceedings, concluding unanimously that it did not. On the other hand, other cases like Reynolds[10] and Arthur[11] decided around the same time proclaim that it was à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å "common groundà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ that the Act would soon come to force and consideration would have to be given to Convention rights and attached jurisprudence. The passage of time has not shed too much clarity on the matter and there have been cases in which it has asserted that common law should not develop in line with Convention rights as the Act provides ample remedies under ss 7 and 8 thereof to redress human rights violations. This view was adopted by the House of Lords in Watkins v Home Office[12] and reaffirmed by Lord Brown in Van Colle.[13] Similarly, in JD v. East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust Ors Lord Nicholls drew a clear distinction between the approach of the court in considering negligence claims in tort and those under the Convention/HRA, stating that à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"sometimes in human rights cases(it is) appropriate for an international or domestic court to look backwards over everything which happened. In deciding whether overall the end result was acce ptable the court makes a value judgment based on more flexible notions than the common law standard of reasonableness and does so freed from the legal rigidity of a duty of care.'[14] Nonetheless, as will be seen later, the influence of the Act/Convention is certainly there in tort cases. Steele characterises the influence of the Act on tort law as a à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"cascade- no less real, but less predictable and far harder to trace with certaintyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ but argues that even of the Act was repealed, the à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"values inherent in the law of tort and resembling the Convention rights that have been reinforced or energised by the Actà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ would not necessarily be unravelled simply by such a repeal and the courts would also perhaps not be inclined to do so.[15] Privacy and Human Rights: The concept of privacy is essentially a concept of the United States articulated first in the famous article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis entitled The Right to Privacy in 1890 in which the authors asserted that it was an extension of the tort of trespass which hitherto was applicable only to tangible/physical property and was necessitated due to the march of technology and an overzealous press which allowed increased interferences into ones personal life that impacted on ones right to be let alone.'[16] Traditionally, there is no distinct tort of invasion or breach of privacy in the United Kingdom. As late as 2004, Lord Hoffmann stated in Wainwright Anor v Home Office that The need in the United States to break down the concept of invasion of privacy into a number of loosely-linked torts must cast doubt upon the value of any high-level generalisation which can perform a useful function in enabling one to deduce the rule to be applied in a concrete case. English law has so far been unwilling, perhaps unable, to formulate any such high-level principleà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ going on say that privacy could be protected under several common law and statutory remedies including trespass, nuisance, defamation, malicious falsehood, equitable action for breach of confidence, the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and the Data Protection Act 1998 but the law still left gaps which may or may not be filled by judicious development of an existing principle.'[17] In the context of the Convention, the right to privacy is provided as a qualified right (subject to national security, public safety, prevention of crime and protection of health and morals as well as the rights and freedoms of others) in Article 8 thereof which states that à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondenceà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ [Art. 8(1)]. The seminal case of the Strasbourg court dealing with the right to privacy in a dispute between private entities is Von Hannover v Germany[18]relating to paparazzi photographs of a celebrity which could not be prevented from being published in the popular press, the court found in favour of the Applicant and held that there was no public interest inherent in publication of private photographs and that the state in such circumstances had a positive duty to ensure the privacy of its citizens under Article 8. An example of both the vertical as well as horizontal application of Convention rights is the decision of the ECtHR in Peck v UK[19] in which CCTV camera footage of the applicant trying to commit suicide was released by the Council to the local print and TV press which showed it extensively was regarded as violation of his Article 8 right. While this may be an admirable extension of Article 8 rights for privacy protection in the private space, English courts have expressed doubt on the absolute nature of the principle and the direct horizontal application of Article 8 rights in the private sphere. In a recent decision in Malik v Fassenfelt Ors, Lord Toulson has stated that the primary ambit of Article 8 is a negative injunction on the State to not interfere with a persons private life or home, etc. except on limited grounds. The nature, scope and ambit of the states positive obligations remain unclear. It is true that the Strasbourg court has held in some cases that there is a positive duty of the state to take measures for protection of a persons private life from interference by another private person or private enterprise, for example, against criminal acts X Y v Netherlands[20] and MC v Bulgaria[21] or against the paparazzi as in Von Hannover. à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"However, these are striking and unusual cases in which the applicants were victims of particularly objectionable conduct which seriously impaired their ability to lead a normal life. Article 8 does not ordinarily apply to regulate conduct in the private sector.[22] However, this may be regarded as obiter dicta since the Court of Appeal in Ash Anor v McKennitt Ors[23] has placed great reliance on Von Hannover and the principle of restricting me dia freedom and opting for its rationale rather than the permissiveness accorded to the press by such decisions as A v B plc.[24] Buxton LJ in McKennitt admitted that the two rulings could not be reconciled but deemed A v B to be inapplicable to the proceedings before it by stating that à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"If the court in A v B had indeed ruled definitively on the content and application of article 10 then the position would be different; but that is what the court did not do. Having made the important observation that the content of the domestic law was now to be found in the balance between articles 8 and 10, the court then addressed the balancing exercise effectively in the former English domestic terms of breach of confidence. No Convention authority of any sort was even mentioned.à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ Thus, in McKennitt, the court not only placed importance on Convention rights but impliedly regarded Convention jurisprudence to be more applicable in view of the grafting of Articles 8 a nd 10 into English tort law on protection of private information. The High Court in Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers Ltd has regarded this approach in McKennitt as indicative of the fact that Von Hannover à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"has been identified as definitive of this aspect of the English tort of misuse of private information.à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢[25] Such a reading comports with other English cases as well. In Campbell for instance, English courts have explicitly held that development of common law has been in harmony with Convention rights and accordingly read Article 8 right as part of the common law ground of breach of confidence while granting relief to the appellant in a private dispute thereby recognising the horizontal application of Convention right. When considering an Article 8 right, another right, that of freedom of expression of a person seeking to use the sensitive information (usually the press but not always) provided for in Article 10 also comes into play. This freedom is recognised in s 12(3) of HRA and according to the House of Lords is a direct Parliamentary response to apprehensions of restrictions against the media[26] when enforcing Article 8 rights upon enactment of the HRA that leaves no doubt that horizontal application of Article 8 rights was contemplated or envisaged by the lawmakers. Therefore, the position that emerges is that Articles 8 and 10 rights have been à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"shoehornedà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ into the tort of breach of confidence in such circumstances while considering whether there has been any breach of privacy in such circumstances[27] and as such it does not matter whether the guilty party is a public body or a private entity. When Articles 8 and 10 are in conflict, Lord Steyn has given the à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"ultimate balancing testà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ in In re S (a child) where he has stated that neither article has precedence over the other and that a comparative analysis on the specific rights claimed and justifications f or interference or restriction should be undertaken along with the proportionality test.[28] Ward LJ in the landmark decision of ETK v News Group Newspapers Ltd[29] has kept Article 8 as the centre of the first stage test when deciding an application for interim injunction to restrain publicity of private information which is to ascertain whether the applicant has a reasonable expectation of privacy so as to engage Article 8; if not, the claim fails. In case Article 8 is applicable, the court can move to the second stage and apply Lord Steyns four parts ultimate balancing test. These guidelines including the applicability of Article 8 have been quoted with approval by the High Court in recent cases such as PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd Ors[30] and Rocknroll, which all involve disputes between private entities. In fact, in Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd[31] in which the court held that the privacy of the famous author, JK Rowlingà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s infant son were violated by the priva te media companies, the claim was largely based on the violation of the childà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢s Article 8 Convention right indicating that the court was operating from the standpoint of s 6(3) of the HRA as discussed above. Conclusion: From the above overview, it may be reasonably concluded that while the initial stages of horizontal application of human rights in privacy law was in doubt, a majority of cases leave no doubt that it is indeed applicable. As stated by Steele and noted by the High Court in Theakston v MGN Ltd[32] this has been made possible by grafting Convention principles into tort law which removes any limitations on the status of the guilty party. Cases such as Murray presume Article 8 to be an integral part of English law in its own right and do not question the assertion of the right against private entities despite the intervening framework of the HRA, which concentrates on the acts, and omissions of public authorities. Bibliography A v B plc [2003] QB 195 Arthur J.S. Hall and Co. v Simons [2000] 2 All ER 673 Ash Anor v McKennitt Ors [2006] EWCA Civ 1714 Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457 Cream Holdings Ltd Ors v Banerjee Ors [2004] 4 All ER 617 Douglas v Hello! (No3) [2006] QB 125 Ewing K, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ (1999) 62 Modern law Review 79 ETK v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 439 Gregory v Portsmouth City Council [2001] 1 All ER 560 Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle [2009] 1 AC 225 Hunt M, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"The Effect on the Law of Obligationsà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ in Basil Markesinis (ed), The Impact of the Human Rights Bill on English Law (Clarendon Press 1998) In re S (a child) [2005] 1 AC 593 JD v. East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust Ors [2005] 2 AC 373 Klug F, The Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v Hart and All That [1999] PL 246 Malik v Fassenfelt Ors [2013] EWCA Civ 798 MC v Bulgaria (2003) 15 BHRC 627 Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446 Peck v UK [2003] ECHR 44 PNM v Times Newspapers Ltd Ors [2013] EWHC 3177 (QB) Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch) Sedley S, Freedom, Law and Justice (Hamlyn Lectures 1999) 38Wright J, Tort Law and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2001) Steele J, Tort Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2010) Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137 (QB) Von Hannover v Germany [2004] ECHR 294 Wade W, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"Horizons of Horizontalityà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ (2000) 116 LQR 217 Wainwright Anor v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 Warren S and Brandeis L, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"The Right to Privacyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ (1890) 4 Harvard LR 193 Watkins v Home Office [2006] 2 AC 395 X Y v Netherlands (1985) 8 EHRR 235 1 [1] [2009] 1 AC 225 [58] [2] Jane Wright, Tort Law and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2001) 22 [3] Keith Ewing, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ (1999) 62 Modern law Review 79, 89 [4] In Francesca Klug, The Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v Hart and All That [1999] PL 246 [5] [2004] 2 AC 457 [6] William Wade, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"Horizons of Horizontalityà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ (2000) 116 LQR 217 [7] Murray Hunt, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"The Effect on the Law of Obligationsà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ in Basil Markesinis (ed), The Impact of the Human Rights Bill on English Law (Clarendon Press 1998) 180 [8] Stephen Sedley, Freedom, Law and Justice (Hamlyn Lectures 1999) 38 [9] [2001] 1 All ER 560 [10] Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 [11] Arthur J.S. Hall and Co. v Simons [2000] 2 All ER 673 [12] [2006] 2 AC 395 [13] Van Colle (n 1) [138] [14] [2005] 2 AC 373 [93] [15] Jenny Steele, Tort Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2010) 24-26 [16] Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã‹Å"The Right to Privacyà ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã¢â€ž ¢ (1890) 4 Harvard LR 193, 193-196 [17] [2004] 2 AC 406 [18] [18] [2004] ECHR 294 [19] [2003] ECHR 44 [20] (1985) 8 EHRR 235 [23] [21] (2003) 15 BHRC 627 [153] [22] [2013] EWCA Civ 798 [44] [23] [2006] EWCA Civ 1714 [24] [2003] QB 195 [25] [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch) [11] [26] Cream Holdings Ltd Ors v Banerjee Ors [2004] 4 All ER 617 [15] [27] Douglas v Hello! (No3) [2006] QB 125 [53] [28] [2005] 1 AC 593 [17] [29] [2011] EWCA Civ 439 [10] [30] [2013] EWHC 3177 (QB) [31] [2008] EWCA Civ 446 [32] [2002] EWHC 137 (QB) [28]